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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 11-1853 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
RONALD COLEN, 
                                                                               Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 2-10-cr-00474-001) 
District Judge: Honorable John P. Fullam 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 19, 2012 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, 
and O‟CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.)* 
 
(Opinion filed: May 18, 2012) 
 
OPINION 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Ronald Colen was indicted by a grand jury on July 27, 2010, and charged with one 
count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1).  Prior to trial, Colen filed a motion to suppress  physical evidence and an 
inculpatory statement that police obtained after he was searched during the course of a 
traffic stop.   The district court denied the motion and Colen thereafter entered a 
                                              
 
*
Hon. Sandra Day O‟Connor, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, sitting by designation. 
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conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, thereby reserving 
the right to appeal the suppression ruling. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
district court.
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I. 
 Since we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we need 
not set forth the underlying facts or procedural history except to the extent that they assist 
our brief discussion.  
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and 
searches without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).  However, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), the Supreme Court held that “police can stop and briefly detain a person for 
investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable 
facts that criminal activity „may be afoot,‟ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”  
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).  Thus, 
where – as here – police conduct a valid traffic stop they may conduct a limited search 
for weapons by patting-down the driver and/or occupants of the stopped vehicle for their 
own protection.  If the police have reasonable suspicion to believe that the person stopped 
may be armed and dangerous, such a suspicion is supported by articulable  facts.  Terry, 
392 U.S. at 21;  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009).   
                                              
1
 We review the district court‟s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the 
underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review of the district court‟s application 
of the law to those facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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 However, because of the danger police face when they engage in traffic stops, the 
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment allows them to extend the scope of 
the Terry search to  areas of the stopped vehicle where a weapon may be hidden.  
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983).  
 In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332 (1990), the Supreme Court explained: 
In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032  (1983), the principles of 
Terry were applied in the context of a roadside encounter: 
“[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be 
placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses 
a reasonable belief based on „specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with the rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant‟ the officer in believing that the 
suspect in dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate 
control of weapons.”  Id. at 1049-1050 (quoting Terry, supra, 
392 U.S., at 21).  The Long Court expressly rejected the 
contention that Terry restricted preventative searches to the 
person of the detained suspect.  463 U.S. at 1047.  In a sense, 
Long authorized a “frisk” of an automobile for weapons. 
 
 Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause  and 
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.  United States 
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002) (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7).  Although 
reasonable suspicion requires more than an “unparticularized suspicion or „hunch,‟” the 
police officer “need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is 
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in his belief 
that his safety or that of others was in danger.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  “To determine 
whether reasonable suspicion exists, we must consider the “ „totality of the circumstances 
– the whole picture.‟”  United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002) 
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(quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8).   This includes the officer‟s “knowledge, experience, 
and common sense judgment about human behavior.”   Robertson, 305 F.3d at 167.  
“This . . . allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to 
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them 
that might well elude an untrained person.”  Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
II. 
 Colen argues that the circumstances here did not support a reasonable suspicion 
that he was armed and dangerous.  He submits that after being stopped for a traffic 
violation, he remained calm and cooperated with the police. Colen relies on United States 
v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005), in arguing that reaching for a center console 
during a traffic stop in a high crime neighborhood does not warrant this kind of search 
and that a contrary ruling would diminish the privacy rights of all who reside in such 
neighborhoods as they would be subject to a search whenever they gesture toward their 
consoles or glove compartments during a traffic stop.  
In McKoy, the court granted a suppression motion and explained that: “[i]t is 
simply not reasonable to infer that a driver is armed and dangerous because the officers 
believe that he appears nervous and reaches toward the car‟s console when approached 
by police, even in a high-crime area.”  Id. at 41.  The court noted that reaching toward the 
center console “is also consistent with reaching for a driver‟s license or registration, a 
perfectly lawful action that is to be expected when one is pulled over by the police.  The 
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government‟s proposed standard comes too close to allowing an automatic frisk of 
anyone who commits a traffic violation in a high-crime area.”  Id.  at 40.  
 McKoy  doesn‟t help Colen because the police had already seen him retrieve his 
license and registration from his pocket.  They therefore knew he was not reaching for 
either of those items when they saw him gesture toward the center console.  They 
therefore had reason to both suspect his intentions and reason to be concerned for their 
own safety.  
The police officers had a valid basis to stop Colen for investigation of a motor 
vehicle code violation because he was driving an automobile with excessively tinted 
windows.  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).   In the course of such a 
stop, police may exercise reasonable control over the car and its passengers.  United 
States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004).   The Supreme Court has explained 
that this goes as far as allowing police to order the occupants out of  a car and searching 
them even in the absence of particularized suspicion.  Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11.  Here, 
once police made the valid traffic stop of the car Colen was driving, they quite properly 
asked him for his license and registration.  United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 Here, the police acted reasonably. Their suspicion was aroused when they saw 
Colen quickly shut the center console as they first approached the car.  They did not 
conduct a search at that point although they clearly could have under Mimms.  Thereafter, 
Colen removed his license and registration from his rear pants pocket, thus negating a 
possible explanation for his gestures toward the center console.   When the officers 
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returned to their car, they both saw Colen again reaching for the center console.  Only 
then did the officers remove him from the car,  frisk him, and search the portion of the 
interior of the car that would have been within his immediate control when they allowed 
him to get back in.  It was during that protective search that Officer Mason  found the 
loaded handgun.     
 When deciding to conduct the kind of limited search that occurred here, “„an 
officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed‟ so long as the officer‟s 
concern was objectively reasonable.”  United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (quoting Moorefield, 111 F.3d at 13-14).   The officers‟ decision to check the 
center console for weapons was completely justified by the circumstances here.  
III. 
 For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the district court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
